nitive despite its obvious inappropriateness? My guess is that most of us use the term cognitive in this context as shorthand for cognitive ability and knowledge, constructs validly measured by high-stakes tests. Convinced that such tests explain a significant proportion of variance in performance, we are interested in understanding what else predicts achievement. We want to know, for instance, why some graduate students or employees are dramatically more successful than others, even after controlling for SAT scores. Used this way, the term noncognitive embraces personality and temperament traits, interests, values, and goals.
At first glance, it may seem that what distinguishes cognitive from noncognitive traits is that the former describe what one can do and the latter what one usually does. It is true that cognitive ability and knowledge are capacities that depend on the motivation of the individual to be expressed; they are upper bounds on behavior. It is also true that many noncognitive traits (e.g., sociability, kindness) are, in contrast, propensities, or patterns of behavior; they are the expected value (i.e., mean) of behavior.
It is a mistake to conflate the cognitive versus noncognitive dimension with the capacity versus propensity dimension. See Table 1 . For any given capacity, there is an accompanying propensity. The propensity to act in a certain way is obviously limited by one's capacity to act in that way, but propensity and capacity are surprisingly weakly correlated (Sackett, Zedeck, & Fogli, 1988) . For instance, the tendency to put forth intellectual effort in day-to-day living is not impressively correlated with measures of fluid intelligence (Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997) .
Whereas intelligence is almost always studied as a capacity rather than a propensity, the opposite is true of noncognitive traits. In fact, for most noncognitive constructs, valid measures of capacity have not been developed (e.g., how sociable an individual could act when maximally motivated to do so). One exception is selfcontrol. As a capacity, self-control has been operationally defined as the number of seconds preschoolers can wait for a preferred, larger treat over a smaller one. However, particularly among older subjects, self-control is more often assessed using questionnaire items such as "I refuse things that are bad for me." In this case, what is being measured is a propensityspecifically, the level of self-control an individual demonstrates in daily life.
An important feature of capacities, whether cognitive or noncognitive, is that they are amenable to measurement by performance tasks in which motivation is maximized (e.g., high-stakes tests). Propensities, in contrast, are only measurable by integrating observations of an individual's behavior over long periods of time. Who is in a position to make such observations? Only informants and the individual himself, all of whose judgments are subjective.
I suspect that the necessarily subjective nature of questionnaires has made this mode of assessment unattractive to policymakers and testing companies. In contrast to intelligence and achievement tests, the vast majority of questionnaires used in psychology research lack current norms based on large samples. Lack of information on normative variance in the population makes it impossible to follow Sackett et al.'s (2008) advice to use psychometric formulas to correct estimates of predictive validity for restriction on range.
Consider the study by Duckworth and Seligman (2005) , which Sackett and colleagues (2008) used to demonstrate the importance of correcting for range restriction. In this study, both self-control and IQ were used to predict grade point average and other outcomes among adolescents at a public magnet school. Admission criteria association between intelligence and procrastination in this study. Self-controlled students procrastinated less, whereas more intelligent students procrastinated more.) In which direction does progress lie? For the particular problem of range restriction, one might exploit more sophisticated means of correcting parameter estimates. For instance, in the econometric literature, the two-stage Heckman correction is widely used to correct for bias in estimates derived from selected samples. The Heckman correction has never been used in a published psychology article.
Coincidentally, since winning the Nobel Prize for his work on selection bias, Heckman has devoted himself to the study of noncognitive individual differences and their effects on wages and other important outcomes (see Borghans, Duckworth, Heckman, & ter Weel, 2008) . Given that a shared goal of the social sciences is to use the most powerful measurement and analysis tools to understand and improve the human condition, it seems that in exploring the vast territory of individual differences not captured by high-stakes tests, crossdisciplinary collaboration may be the most promising way forward. Sackett, Borneman, and Connelly (MayJune 2008) argued that several common criticisms of cognitively laden tests are not well supported by the literature. The authors' systematic exploration of research surrounding seven specific criticisms is laudable, and we do not find fault with their conclusions as presented. In evaluating the seven concerns, however, the authors largely neglected the criteria that such tests are intended to predict. As a result, readers may come away with the erroneous conclusion that all is well in the mass testing world of cognitive ability. We wish to expand on Sackett et al.'s review by raising concerns about traditional approaches to defining academic and organizational success. In doing so, we argue for the importance of creativity. The authors addressed the "popular" concerns, with a focus on the test-taking process and the measures themselves. Consequently, the larger decision-making context in which such tests are used was given little consideration. The strengths and weaknesses of any predictor are necessarily linked to the established criteria and cannot be adequately evaluated without also examining the appropriateness of the measured outcomes it is intended to predict. The limitations of cognitive testing, and the importance of alternative predictors, are best evaluated in the context of expanded criteria.
The debate about "alternative" predictors of performance has a long history in industrial/organizational psychology and education. Although cognitive ability remains firmly entrenched as the strongest predictor of performance (Schmidt & Hunter, 2004) , other constructs (e.g., conscientiousness) have predictive power. However, less time has been spent examining criteria (Day & Schleicher, 2007) . We argue that criterion deficiency and stagnation may be as plausible a reason for the continued validation of cognitive tests as the integrity of the measures themselves.
The increased importance of cognitive-based standardized tests in education and employment selection naturally limits the use of outcomes other than traditional measures (e.g., grade point average). Are grades the best possible criteria, however? Enright and Gitomer (1989) identified seven important generalized competencies that graduate school professors and admissions committees identified as being most important; the ability to get good grades was not on this list. Demonstrating the limitations of cognitive-based tests, Sternberg and Williams (1997) found some evidence that when the criteria were expanded to include dissertation ratings, the predictive power of Graduate Record Examination scores dropped. The danger is that these findings may be used as evidence that such outcomes are not relevant criteria rather than as an indication that cognitive-based predictors are not as comprehensive as we tend to believe. We believe we must also critically examine expanded criteria.
Indeed, Sackett et al. (2008) acknowledged these concerns when they noted, "It is important to differentiate between technical questions . . . and values-based questions, such as those about the relative importance of one criterion versus another" (p. 225, italics added). Clearly their article
